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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
DENNY LEE MOORE, 
Defendant/Appellant -
Case No. 20061147-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a conviction on one count of 
possession of an incendiary or explosive device, a second degree 
felony (R. 186-88).x This Court has jurisdiction over the appeal 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e)(West 2004). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE ON APPEAL AND 
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
Did the trial court properly deny defendant's mistrial 
motion based on prosecutorial misconduct where defendant did not 
establish that, absent the alleged misconduct, he would likely 
have enjoyed a more favorable trial outcome? 
1
 Throughout his brief, defendant describes the crime from 
which he is appealing as "reckless possession." While the minute 
entries consistently describe the crime as "reckless possession," 
both the information and the signed jury verdict refer simply to 
"possession." Compare, e.g., R. 170-73, 186-88 with R. 1-2, 162. 
The jury was instructed consistent with the information and 
signed jury verdict. That is, the jury was instructed that a 
mens rea of knowing, intentional, or reckless would suffice to 
establish the crime. .See R. 199: 180, 192-93. 
A reviewing court will not reverse a trial court's denial of 
a motion for mistrial based on prosecutorial misconduct absent an 
abuse of discretion. State v. Pritchett, 2003 UT 24, 11 10, 69 
P.3d 1278. This standard is met only if, absent the error, 
defendant would have enjoyed a reasonable likelihood of a more 
favorable result. Id. (emphasizing that trial court is best 
positioned to assess an alleged error's impact on the proceedings). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-306(3)(West 2004), governing 
possession of explosive, chemical, or incendiary devices, 
provides: 
Any person is guilty of a second degree 
felony who, under circumstances not amounting 
to a violation of Title 76, Chapter 10, Part 
4, Weapons of Mass Destruction, knowingly, 
intentionally, or recklessly possesses or 
controls an explosive, chemical, or 
incendiary device. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged with one count of possession of an 
explosive device, a second degree felony (R. 1-2).2 A jury 
convicted him as charged (R. 162, R. 199: 229). The court 
2
 He was convicted of possession of an incendiary device. 
Compare R. 1-2 with R. 186-88. The difference, however, is 
insignificant. The governing statute treats "explosive, 
chemical, or incendiary device[s]" interchangeably. All three 
terms include "dynamite and all other forms of high explosives, . 
. . blasting agents to include. . .blasting caps, [and]. . . 
exploding cords commonly called detonating cord [or] detcord . . 
.." Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-306(1) (a) (i) (West 2004) . 
2 
sentenced defendant to a suspended prison term of one-to-fifteen 
years; ordered 36 months of probation, 150 hours of community 
service, and payment of fines and fees; and imposed a variety of 
conditions (R. 186-88). Defendant filed a timely notice of 
appeal (R. 189). 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
After receiving a tip from defendant's ex-wife and her 
partner that defendant had dynamite in his possession, two police 
officers conducted a "knock and talk" at defendant's home (R. 
199: 32-34). Defendant answered the door. Officer Olive 
introduced himself and Officer Jones-Williams, showed defendant 
his credentials, and asked if it was okay to ask some questions 
(Id. at 36, 86). After defendant granted permission, the officer 
told defendant to think carefully before answering. He then 
asked, "''Do you have any dynamite in the house?'" (Id. at 36, 
86). Defendant paused, looked around the yard, and answered, 
v>,vYes, I do'" (Id. ) . Officer Olive asked defendant if he would 
show it to him (Id. at 37). Defendant said, "^Yes,'" and led the 
officers away from several children playing nearby to a root 
cellar located about 30 yards away in the backyard (Id. at 37-
39) . 
Using Officer Jones-Williams' flashlight for illumination, 
the three entered the structure through a wooden door hinged for 
a padlock, and then descended a flight of about 15 stairs into a 
3 
single, small, dark room (Id. at 39-40). As defendant opened the 
unsecured door, he commented to the officers, "xIt looks like 
someone broke into it'" (Id. at 40). Officer Jones-Williams 
described the cellar: 
The room is — was a very small room. You 
really — there were no corners to hide in, 
nothing, I mean, entering the cellar you 
could see what was in there. To the left 
there was a pallet with a few boxes on it, I 
don't recall how many boxes. And then to the 
right of that, there were two more boxes on 
the ground. 
(Id. at 88-89). 
At the bottom of the stairs, defendant looked around and 
told the officers, "AWell, this is where the dynamite was.'" (Id. 
at 41). Officer Olive asked if he could examine the two boxes on 
the ground. Defendant consented, and the officer, feeling with 
gloved hands under the sawdust in the box, discovered two eight-
inch sticks of soft gel dynamite (Id. at 42-43). He also 
observed "a wet substance on the concrete floor" coming from the 
box, which led him to conclude the dynamite was "sweating" and 
thus becoming more unstable, as well as several partial rolls of 
detonator cord (Id. at 45-46, 63-64, 66-67). 
After the officers saw the detonator cord, defendant began 
verbally distancing himself from the explosives by offering a 
variety of explanations for their presence in the root cellar 
(Id. at 44-45, 48). He claimed the root cellar had been broken 
into a week earlier (Id. at 122). He suggested that a cleaning 
4 
crew or painters who had worked for him might have left the 
explosives (Id. at 44, 74). Finally, he surmised that his ex-
wife left the explosives in the root cellar to frame him (Id. at 
44, 48, 72) . 
At this juncture, having observed potentially unstable 
dynamite as well at det cord, the officers agreed, "it's time to 
gracefully back out, and that's what we did" (Id. at 46-47). A 
Salt Lake County bomb squad technician was notified, and he 
immediately reported to the scene (Id. at 43, 90). In addition 
to the dynamite and detonator cord, the bomb technician found a 
box of #8 blasting caps, sufficient to detonate either the 
dynamite or det cord (Id. at 102). After evacuating the 
residential block, the bomb technician removed the explosives, 
later confirming that they were fully functional (Id. at 110-11). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion 
in denying his mistrial motion based on prosecutorial misconduct 
for certain remarks and questions made during trial. He contends 
the prosecutor intended these comments and questions to invoke 
fear in the jury and caused the jury to convict him improperly. 
The trial court ruled that one brief comment referencing 
terrorism was, indeed, improper but had been cured by defendant's 
prompt objection, followed by striking the comment, an immediate 
admonition to disregard it, and a later instruction that the jury 
5 
must not consider any matters stricken by the court. The court 
also ruled that it did not "think that the bounds were exceeded" 
with respect to other comments and questions referencing the 
dangers of explosives to children and issues of safe storage and 
proper handling of explosives. 
The trial court did not abuse its discretion. The court was 
in the most advantaged position to evaluate the impact of the 
fleeting reference to terrorism on the trial as a whole. It 
cannot reasonably be said that the prosecutor's brief misstep, 
ameliorated by the court in multiple ways, deprived defendant of 
a fair trial. 
Even assuming arguendo that the remaining references were 
improper, defendant has wholly failed to demonstrate any 
prejudicial effect. First, the evidence against him was 
substantial and strong. He admitted he had explosives in his 
home and led the officers directly to them. Second, his defense 
was weak. His own witness denied possessing the explosives. 
And, third, any prosecutorial error was ameliorated by the jury 
instructions, to which defendant has mounted no challenge. 
Defendant is entitled to a fair trial, not a perfect one. 
Where defendant has not shown that, absent the allegedly improper 
comments and questions, he would likely have enjoyed a better 
trial outcome, the court did not abuse its discretion in denying 
his mistrial motion based on prosecutorial misconduct. 
6 
ARGUMENT 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED 
DEFENDANT'S MISTRIAL MOTION BASED 
ON PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT WHERE 
DEFENDANT DID NOT ESTABLISH THAT, 
ABSENT THE ALLEGED MISCONDUCT, HE 
WOULD LIKELY HAVE ENJOYED A MORE 
FAVORABLE TRIAL OUTCOME 
The gist of defendant's argument is that the trial court 
should have granted his mistrial motion because the prosecutor 
committed misconduct by making statements and asking questions 
that were irrelevant, that inflamed the passions of the jury, and 
that prejudiced the outcome of his case. Specifically, he 
contends, because the prosecutor misinterpreted recklessness — 
one of the three possible mental states for possession of an 
explosive device — he made statements and asked questions that 
"focused on issues such as children and explosives, improper 
storage of explosives, and explosives and terrorists." Br. of 
Aplt. at 6; accord id. at 13-15. This focus, he asserts, was 
"meant to invoke the sympathies, passions and fears of the jury 
and to confuse the jury as to what the elements were." Id. at 
15. Absent the objectionable remarks, defendant contends, the 
jury would have entertained a reasonable doubt that he knowingly, 
intentionally, or recklessly possessed the explosives. Id. at 
20. 
To demonstrate prosecutorial misconduct, a defendant must 
first show that counsel's conduct "call[ed] to the attention of 
7 
the jury a matter it would not be justified in considering in 
determining its verdict." State v. Bradley, 2002 UT App 348, 5 
42, 57 P.3d 1139 (citations and quotation marks omitted). 
Defendant must then show "that the effect of [the prosecutor's 
conduct] was ^substantial and prejudicial such that there is a 
reasonable likelihood that, in [its] absence, there would have 
been a more favorable result.'" State v. Devey, 2006 UT App 219, 
1 10, 138 P.3d 90 (quoting State v. Wright, 893 P.2d 1113, 1118 
(Utah App. 1995)). "x[I]f proof of defendant's guilt is strong, 
the challenged conduct or remark will not be presumed 
prejudicial.'" State v. Vargas, 2001 UT 5, 1 45, 20 P.3d 271 
(citation omitted); see also State v. Schultz, 2002 UT App 366, 
5 35, 58 P.3d 879 (holding that error in admitting evidence was 
harmless where other evidence supporting conviction was 
substantial); State v. Blubaugh, 904 P.2d 688, 700 (Utah App. 
1995)(admission of irrelevant evidence, although an abuse of 
discretion, was nonetheless harmless), cert, denied, 913 P.2d 749 
(Utah 1996) . 
When a trial court concludes that the incident to which 
defendant objects likely did not prejudice the jury, the trial 
court should deny the motion. The Utah Supreme Court has 
explained: 
Unless a review of the record shows that the 
court's decision is plainly wrong in that the 
incident so likely influenced the jury that 
the defendant cannot be said to have had a 
8 
fair trial, we will not find that the court's 
decision was an abuse of discretion. We 
review such a decision with just deference 
because of the advantaged position of the 
trial judge to determine the impact of events 
occurring in the courtroom on the total 
proceedings. . . . 
State v. Robertson, 932 P.2d 1219, 1230 (Utah 1997) (citing Burton 
v. Zions Corp. Mercantile Inst., 249 P.2d 514, 517 (Utah 1952)), 
overruled on other grounds by State v. Weeks, 2002 UT 98, 1 24, 
61 P.3d 1000. 
Here, in the course of the trial, defendant objected to 
several of the prosecutor's questions and comments. He objected 
to questions about the number and age of children on the premises 
when the officers spoke with defendant at his home (R. 199: 37-
38, 52). He objected to questions about the proper storage of 
explosives (Id. at 105-06, 113). He objected during closing 
arguments to the prosecutor's characterization of recklessness as 
"disregarding a substantial and unjustifiable . . . risk that 
you'll blow something up" and to a statement that "we don't want 
[explosives] falling into terrorist's hands" (Id. at 220, 202).3 
3
 On appeal, he adds to this list questions to which he did 
not object and which are, accordingly, unpreserved — questions 
asked of the sole defense witness about how blasting caps can be 
dangerous to children and how children play with dynamite (Id. at 
160-61, 165). For the first time on appeal, he also objects to a 
statement by the prosecutor in closing argument, referencing the 
presence of children at defendant's home and the ways in which 
children can play with inherently dangerous explosives (Id. at 
202). Because defendant made no objection to these statements 
below, the trial court had no opportunity to rule on them. 
Accordingly, this Court should not consider them now. See State 
9 
At the end of trial, defendant moved for a mistrial, arguing 
that the State's remarks had a cumulative effect and "potentially 
inflame[d] the passions of the jury where they would convict, not 
based on facts and evidence, not based on the law, but based upon 
this fear, danger and things blowing up." (Id. at 224) 
(replacement page). In rejecting defendant's argument, the court 
ruled: 
You know, counsel, I felt like the statement 
relating to terrorist or terrorism was 
inappropriate. I immediately cautioned the 
jury with regard to that. I struck that from 
the record. They were advised in the 
instructions that they were to disregard 
that, and I have the firm belief that if 
there was any impropriety with regard to 
that, that was corrected and we did 
everything that was appropriate and possible 
under those circumstances. 
Secondly, with regard to any cumulative 
effect, I think that . . . the State's 
entitled to make logical inferences, and I 
don't think that the bounds were exceeded 
with regard to those, and based on that I'm 
not going to grant a mistrial under those 
circumstances. . . . 
(Id. at 225-26). 
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in so ruling. 
Following the prosecutor's reference to "terrorist's hands," 
defense counsel promptly objected, a sidebar was held, and the 
court ruled: 
v. Pledger, 896 P.2d 1226, 1229 n.5 (Utah 1995). 
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Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, and I want 
you to disregard, and I'm going to strike 
from the record any reference to terrorists 
or terrorism with regard to this matter and 
you're not to consider that as part of your 
deliberations. I'm going to allow the State 
to continue and proceed under those 
circumstances. 
(R. 199: 203). The court properly handled defendant's objection. 
See State v. Kohl, 2000 UT 35, 1 24, 999 P.2d 7 (noting that 
defendant's prompt objection, the trial court's sustaining of the 
objection, and an immediate curative instruction negated a 
demonstration of prejudice resulting from the prosecutor's 
improper comment). At the end of trial, the court additionally 
instructed the jury that any evidence "which was rejected by me 
or ordered stricken out by me may not be considered by you" and 
that "[y]ou are not to consider evidence offered but not 
admitted, nor any evidence stricken by the Court" (Id. at 182, 
188). Under these circumstances, where the trial court 
participated throughout the trial and evaluated the negligible 
impact of the isolated remark on the proceedings as a whole, it 
cannot reasonably be said that the court was "plainly wrong" and, 
consequently, that it abused its discretion. See Robertson, 932 
P.2d at 1230. 
As to the remaining questions and comments, even assuming 
arguendo that the prosecutor should not have referenced the 
dangers of explosives to children, issues of proper storage of 
explosives, or regulations governing safe handling of explosives, 
11 
defendant has wholly failed to demonstrate that, absent these 
references, his trial outcome would likely have been different. 
First, the evidence against defendant was very strong. See, 
e.g., Schultz, 2002 UT App 366 at 1 35 (harmless error where 
substantial evidence supported conviction). Two police officers 
explicitly asked defendant if he had dynamite in his house, and 
he unequivocally responded that he did (R. 199: 36, 86).4 When 
asked to show the officers where it was, defendant led them 
directly to the root cellar in the back yard (Id. at 39, 87) . 
Once in the cellar, he told the officers this was where the 
dynamite was (Id. at 41). And, indeed, there it was (Id. at 43, 
89) . 
Second, defendant's theory of defense was unconvincing. 
Focusing not on mens era but on "possession" as the linchpin of 
his defense, defendant contended that the explosives belonged to 
his friend, who was properly licensed to possess them. He 
asserted that a workman had inadvertently unloaded the explosives 
from the friend's truck in the course of delivering building 
materials to defendant (Id. at 27-29, 146, 150-52). 
Consequently, defendant maintained, he did not exercise control 
4
 The detective who interviewed defendant testified that, 
contrary to the officers' testimony, defendant denied responding 
in the affirmative to the officer's question about possessing 
dynamite in his home (R. 199: 125). If defendant's statement was 
true, however, it makes no sense that defendant then promptly led 
the officers to the root cellar where the officers found the 
explosives. 
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and dominion over the explosives and thus did not "possess" them. 
Defendant presented his defense through the trial testimony 
of his friend, Kelly Alvey. Alvey initially confirmed that he 
was in the mining business, that he was licensed to handle 
explosives, and that he often delivered building supplies to 
defendant (Id. at 145-46, 150). He further stated that at some 
unspecified time, he realized some dynamite was missing and 
"became aware" that it had been unloaded at defendant's home (Id. 
at 154). 
Defendant's theory that Alvey possessed the explosives 
disintegrated under the State's questioning during cross-
examination. When the State showed a picture of the detonator 
cord found in the root cellar to Alvey, he stated it was likely 
not his. He explained, "I don't think I had det cord. Usually, 
when I went to the Uintahs I never used det cord, so, I don't 
think that's mine" (Id. at 156; accord id. at 168). When the 
State showed him a photograph of the box of blasting caps, Alvey 
stated he hadn't seen the box before (Id. at 154). When the 
State showed him a photograph of the blasting caps lined up 
touching each other inside the box, he said, "[M]y caps, when I 
get them, they're usually in a foam thing and they're stuck in 
like that" (Id. at 160). Referencing the blasting caps touching 
each other rather than being individually cushioned and separated 
by foam, he explained, " [T]hat's an old way. I mean, that's how, 
13 
well, like it [i.e. the box] says, A91" (Id.). Finally, as to 
the dynamite, Alvey testified that if the dynamite was sweating, 
as the lead police officer concluded it was and the bomb 
technician confirmed it was beginning to do, then it "couldn't 
have been" his (Id. at 46, 63, 66-67, 100, 112, 163). He agreed 
that, given the description of the dynamite, it was probably fair 
to say it was not his (Id. at 165-66). 
Under these factual circumstances, the jury was not 
convinced by defendant's argument that the explosives belonged to 
Alvey and that defendant, accordingly, did not "possess" them. 
Where defendant's own witness disclaimed possession and defendant 
told the officers he had explosives and then led the officers 
directly to them, the State adduced proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt that defendant knowingly possessed the explosives.5 
5
 Defendant contends that "the prejudice analysis here 
turns on the reasonable-doubt standard," arguing that because the 
jury was presented with conflicting evidence, it must necessarily 
have entertained a reasonable doubt about his guilt. See Br. of 
Aplt. at 19-21. Specifically, he argues that Alvey's testimony 
"raised reasonable doubt with respect to [defendant's] mental 
state in purportedly possessing the explosives" (Id. at 20). 
The presentation of conflicting evidence, however, does not ipso 
facto create reasonable doubt. Resolving evidentiary conflicts 
is a job entrusted to the jury, whose domain it is to sort 
through the evidence, weigh it, and assess witness 
credibility. See, e.g. , State v. Haves, 860 P.2d 968, 972 (Utah 
App. 1993)(citing State v. Jonas, 793 P.2d 901, 904-05 (Utah App. 
1990) ) (noting jury is exclusive judge of witness credibility and 
weight to be accorded particular evidence). Thus, Alvey's 
testimony would have created reasonable doubt only if the jury 
had found it credible. 
14 
The comments and questions to which defendant objects do 
nothing ' undermine th 1 s outcome T : suggest that the jury 
convicted defendant only because the prosecutor asked questions 
and made comments about the dangers of explosives to children or 
to issues around safe storage and handling of explosives flies in 
the face of defendant's clear admission to the officers, both by 
words ai 1 d by a z t:i • : i 1 , 1 1 i a !:  I: 1 e had explosives in his home. However 
objectionable the comments or questions may have been, they do 
noth:i i 1 g t: : :1 i m i i i :i s 1 I 11 I e o",i;; rer\ ihelming direct evidence of • 
defendant's guilt or to suggest that the verdict would likely 
have been different in their absence. 
Finally, any errors the prosecutor may have committed were 
ameliorated by the jury instructions, to which defendant has 
mounted no challenge. The court instructed the jury that before 
it could find defendant guilty of possession of an explosive 
d e v i : e , i t i n i s t f :i i i :I ] : : t i: I v" :: o i I d u c t prohibited ] : • y ] a v. " ,_.:__: z h e 
applicable, culpable mental state or states with regard to the 
conduct prohibited !»y 1 r-r /" (" ). Th^ juiv itrh'iii'1 i ~-iic; 
correctly recited the charge, with the three applicable mental 
states plainly listed in the alternative (Id. at 180, 197). The 
instructions also clearly defined each of the three mental 
states, leaving no doubt that the jury had only to find one of 
them in oiclei 1 * » convict (Id. at " - 9 3 ) . Other instructions 
told the jury they must be governed solely by the law, that the 
law forbids them from being governed "by mere conjecture, 
passion, [or] prejudice;" and that any evidence "rejected by me 
or ordered stricken out by me may not be considered by you" (Id. 
at 182, 183). They were further instructed not to "consider nor 
be influenced by any statement of counsel as to what the evidence 
is unless it is stated correctly, nor by any statement of counsel 
of facts not shown in the evidence if any such has been made" 
(Id. at 185) . 
Guided by these instructions, the jury need only have 
believed that defendant was "aware of the nature of his conduct 
or the existing circumstances" in order to find that he knowingly 
possessed the explosives (Id. at 192). The testimony of the 
officers that defendant admitted he had explosives in his home 
and, upon request, immediately led the officers to the root 
cellar to show the explosives to them amply establishes the 
"knowing" mens rea. 
The law is well-settled that defendant is entitled to a fair 
trial, not a perfect one. State v. Baker, 935 P.2d 503, 506 
(Utah 1997)(quoting Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 681 
(1986)). Where defendant failed to demonstrate that the 
allegedly improper comments and questions were so prejudicial as 
to render a different verdict likely in their absence, the trial 
court did not abuse its discretion in denying his motion for 
16 
mistrial on the basis of prosecutorial misconduct. See, e.g., 
Pritchett, . ". 
CONCLUSION 
F' or tl 1 3 reasons stated, • " : affirm defendant's 
conviction on one count of possession of an incendiary device, a 
second degree felony. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this 9th day of July, 2007. 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
Attorney General 
r 
'<L 
JOANNE C. SLOTNIK 
Assistant Attorney General 
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